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ABSTRACT 
 
Longstanding speculation about the likelihood of a housing market collapse has given 
way in the past few months to consideration of just how far the housing market will fall 
and how much damage the debacle will inflict on the economy. In this paper, we discuss 
recent developments related to the housing market; econometrically assess the magnitude 
of the impact of housing price decreases on real private expenditure; assess the 
importance of new types of mortgages and mortgage-related securities; and briefly 
analyze possible policy responses. 
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With economic growth cooling to 0.7 percent in the first quarter of 2007, the economy 
can ill afford a slump in consumption by the American household. But it now appears 
that the household sector could finally give in to the pressures of rising gasoline prices, a 
weakening home market, and a large debt burden. The signals are still mixed; for 
example, while April’s retail sales numbers caused concern, May’s were much improved, 
and so was the ISM manufacturing index for June. Consumption growth indicates a 
slowdown. In this working paper, we look at the American household and its economic 
fortunes, concentrating on how falling home prices might hamper economic growth, 
generate social dislocations, and possibly lead to a full-blown financial crisis.  
  First, we review some facts about the U.S. real estate market and recent financial 
developments. Then, we discuss and comment on methods used by economists to gauge 
the economic impact of changes in housing wealth and finance. Third, we step back and 
view recent developments in housing finance and house values in the context of several 
broader theories of the benefits and costs of financial innovations. In particular, following 
McCulley (2007), we are reminded of and use Hyman P. Minsky’s financial fragility 
hypothesis as a frame of reference for the current situation. In the fourth section, before 
concluding, we very briefly discuss some policy options.  
  There are numerous signs that housing, an important part of the expansion after 
the 2001 recession, has begun to cool off. The seasonally adjusted real median price of 
existing homes—the proxy adopted for our evaluation of the impact of the housing 
market on consumption—reveals a sharp turnaround (see Figure 1).
1 After stabilizing for 
about 15 years, this measure rose by 19 percent from 1995 to the first quarter of 2000—
when GDP growth started to slow down—and again by 20 percent to the third quarter of 
2005, when it reached its peak. In the first quarter of 2007, this index lost about 9 percent 




                                                 
1 In general, such indices can be misleading. For the home market, there is no observation of a market-
clearing vector of prices reached in an auction market; rather we observe a relatively small number of 
transactions that leave many homes unsold. Hence, certain problems arise: for example, those homeowners 
whose property values have declined the most may be the most likely to resist an immediate sale, leading to 
an upward bias in the index.    3
 
  
  Rising demand for homes had been driven largely by a steep rise in subprime 
mortgages, which are made to borrowers with a relatively high probability of default, 
many of whom would have been shut out of the market until recently. These loans grew 
fivefold from 2001–05, reaching $625 billion annually (Economist 2006). They now 
account for 14 percent of all mortgages outstanding and have been used for home-equity 
withdrawal, not just first-time home purchases (Bernanke 2007c). The rapid growth of 
the subprime segment of the market took place along with an increase in “exotic” 
mortgage products and variable rate mortgages. These included mortgages that require no 
down payment or proof of income. Lenders have justified lax lending standards with 
new, more sophisticated and automated methods for evaluating creditworthiness, but 
events are beginning to bear out the dire forecasts of many pessimistic analysts. The rate 
of serious delinquencies—with payments at least 90 days late or with the loan in 
foreclosure—has approximately doubled to 12 percent for subprime mortgages with 
adjustable interest rates, and difficulties have been spreading to Alt-A mortgages, which 
are less risky than subprime, but still below prime (Shenn 2007; Bernanke 2007b). Some 
securities backed by risky mortgages have been downgraded by the major bond rating 
firms, a Bear Stearns hedge fund holding billions of dollars in such securities narrowly   4
averted a meltdown in late June (Ng 2007; Howley 2007), and the banks that provide 
capital to mortgage lenders have begun to demand tighter lending standards, more 
documentation of income, and more money down (Shenn 2007). This will curtail the 
demand for homes absolutely, probably leading to further price declines. More problems 
lie around the corner, as many variable-rate mortgages will be subject to upward interest 
rate adjustments in the coming years, just as mortgage interest rates have finally begun to 
rise in earnest. The average rate for a 30-year fixed mortgage rose over half a percentage 
point over a five-week period beginning in early May, a rise that would add $116 per 
month to the mortgage payment on a $300,000 mortgage (Howley 2007). These 
adjustments alone will cause over one million foreclosures on first mortgages originated 
2004–06, according to an industry study by First American CoreLogic, written before the 
recent rate increases (Cagan 2007). Homes lost to foreclosure will wind up on the market, 
a development that will no doubt depress prices even more. 
  A discussion of the subprime mortgage debacle would be incomplete without a 
discussion of how its impact will be felt most strongly among certain demographic 
groups and neighborhoods. Minority neighborhoods and borrowers have been a market 
for subprime lenders, and they stand to lose the most from the ongoing wave of 
foreclosures. The Wall Street Journal (Whitehouse 2007) and the New York Times 
(Eckholm 2007) have recently reported that some neighborhoods and cities already have 
large numbers of vacant homes. Cities must deal with the problem of maintaining these 
homes, which can fall into disrepair and become havens for derelicts and criminals. To an 
economist, idle resources like unoccupied buildings present something of a paradox, but 
few people want to move to a neighborhood with boarded-up homes, and such homes can 
remain vacant and gradually deteriorate for decades. It would be incorrect to deny that 
the decay of entire neighborhoods will have an impact on economic well-being, or 
impose social costs on cities, leaving aside the obvious effect of a loss of household 
assets. Moreover, there will be a larger economic impact of concentrated hardship than 
hardship that is spread evenly throughout society: even if the costs of foreclosures are 
low when considered as a percentage of total loans or national GDP, that part of the 
population that is especially affected may lose access to credit for some time.    5
  Federal Reserve chief Ben Bernanke felt the issue was serious enough to devote 
speeches to subprime mortgages in mid-May and early June (2007b and 2007c). He 
believes that recent curbs in subprime lending, along with an increase in foreclosures, 
will reduce the demand for houses, putting downward pressure on prices. However, he 
emphasized that the “vast majority of mortgages, including even subprime mortgages, 
continue to perform well” (2007c) and that problems with subprime mortgages were 
unlikely to spill over into the rest of the economy or the rest of the financial system. He 
feels that regulators have taken many steps to ensure responsible lending practices, 
though market forces, especially transparency, are ultimately the most effective restraint 
against excessive risk-taking. An earlier speech called for action to shore up the capital of 
the government-sponsored entities that invest in hundreds of billions of dollars in 
mortgages and also bundle them into securities (Bernanke 2007a). Remarkably, it seemed 
to hint that the current position of these companies could lead to a major financial crisis. 
We return to Bernanke’s speeches and their cautiously optimistic view of recent financial 
developments below. But we turn next to an analysis of how adverse events in the 
housing market might affect household consumption, and the economy more generally. 
 
THE IMPACT OF HOUSING WEALTH AND HOME EQUITY WITHDRAWAL 
ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE WILL FIND 
OUT 
 
It will come as no surprise to most readers that economists suspect that the housing boom 
has been an important force behind the economic recovery that began in 2002, and that 
housing may now be leading the economy into a recession or an extended period of very 
weak growth (Godley, Papadimitriou, and Zezza 2007). But in this section we provide 
some further perspectives on the “housing wealth effect” and other related effects on 
consumption spending.  
  There are several ways in which housing is an integral part of a growing 
economy, especially in periods of rapidly rising home values. First, homebuilding, 
furniture sales, and home improvements account for a large percentage of GDP. 
Government statistics show that the residential investment sector is already acting as a   6
drag on economic growth (see Figure 2). Second, rising home prices increase household 
net worth, and consumers probably base their spending decisions partly on their net 
worth, not just their income (Friedman 1957; Keynes 1936, pp. 92–93). It is important to 
distinguish two roles of home equity. First, along with financial assets and the discounted 
value of future income, it is a component of what we call “permanent income,” which in 
turn determines the total amount of households’ consumption. Second, through its role as 
a piggy bank, home equity can make consumption possible when consumers lack cash 
and have no other way to borrow at a reasonable interest rate. Since the general increase 
in the availability of mortgages extends to second mortgages, home equity lines of credit, 
and the like, the piggy-bank effect has become more potent in recent years. The 
importance of loans secured by residential real estate had already increased, when, in 
1986, the tax-deductibility of interest payments on other types of consumer loans used to 
purchase durable goods—autos, appliances, and so on—or obtain cash was eliminated. 
Most studies of how housing wealth affects consumption deal with this dual role—as a 
balance sheet item and source of cash. All of these theories have well-known flaws, but 
they are a reasonable starting point for a discussion, since they are the basis of almost all 
academic and popular discussion of the effect of housing on the economy.  
 
   7
  The simplest way econometricians try to estimate the impact of housing wealth on 
consumption and other economic activity is to estimate a linear relationship, in which 
economic activity is a function of other variables, including housing wealth and perhaps 
mortgage equity withdrawal (the latter comprising mostly home-equity loans and lines of 
credit and cash-out refinancings). This allows one to measure the effect of a given 
increase in home equity or home prices on economic activity, when other variables are 
held constant. Of course, “causality” is an important issue that must be dealt with 
(Campbell and Cocco 2005; Aron and Muellbauer 2006). For example, if one finds that a 
one-dollar increase in home equity is associated with 10 cents of additional consumption, 
it cannot be assumed that the increase in home equity simply caused the increase in 
consumption. There may be some third force, such as expectations of future income 
increases or increased availability of credit, that is driving both home values and 
consumption. There are econometric ways of dealing with problems of causality (and the 
Levy Institute macro model uses some of these), but some quoted estimates of the 
magnitude of housing wealth effects do not incorporate such corrections and are 
essentially correlations or observations of ratios.
2 
  In a useful summary of previous studies, Menegatti and Roubini (2007) find that 
estimates of the propensity to consume out of an additional dollar of housing wealth 
range from 4.5 to 16 cents and that each dollar of home equity withdrawal leads to 10 to 
50 cents of additional consumption spending. We note that such estimates typically do 
not include home improvements, which are thought to constitute a form of investment in 
the home. But at a time of falling home prices when such investments (say, a marble 
countertop in a marginal neighborhood) are probably not leading to appreciation, home 
improvements may in fact best be considered a form of consumption. Also, like 
consumption expenditures, home improvements stimulate employment, a boost to the 
economy that will be partly lost if the home-equity piggy bank is effectively taken away. 
A related point is that home-equity withdrawals used for paying off other forms of debt 
are not technically considered consumption expenditures. But when someone pays for a 
purchase with a credit card and later pays off the credit card balance with a lower-interest 
                                                 
2 Partial correlations are sometimes used, allowing other variables to be taken into account, but this 
technique does not eliminate the problem of causality.   8
home equity loan, the home equity loan has effectively financed the original purchase. 
When home improvements and payoffs of nonmortgage debt are added to actual 
consumption expenditures, the impact of a dollar of home-equity withdrawal is multiplied 
several times over (Greenspan and Kennedy 2007). Shiller (2004) argues that there is 
strong evidence of a regional effect of home prices on consumption.  
  We note some drawbacks of current estimates of housing wealth effects. Aron and 
Muellbauer (2006) have criticized a lack of control variables in many of these studies and 
find that financial liberalization (essentially, greater efficiency in lending and wider 
availability of credit) accounts for a large part of the propensity to consume out of 
housing wealth increases in recent years in South Africa and the United Kingdom. These 
countries have recently experienced financial innovations and deregulation efforts similar 
to those in the United States. Their findings are consistent with several recent articles that 
find that the greatest propensity to consume out of increases in housing wealth exists 
among those who are “liquidity constrained”—i.e., lack cash or other means of 
borrowing to finance current consumption (Hurst and Stafford 2004). On the other hand, 
Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek (2006) criticize so-called cointegration techniques—which 
estimate a long-run relationship among several variables, including consumption
3—on 
the grounds that no such relationship can persist over a period of decades, during which 
numerous factors affecting consumption change greatly.  
  To be sure, there are other studies showing that the United States has had other 
periods of inflated housing prices but has not experienced a boom-bust episode (Bordo 
2005). Aside from choosing the appropriate measure of the effect of housing on 
consumption, it is important to keep in mind the broader issue that estimates of the 
marginal effect of one variable on another may not fully capture certain synergies and 
positive feedbacks that come with any major recession or financial crisis. For example, a 
weakening home market may prevent financially distressed households from refinancing 
their homes, which would lead to foreclosures, which would in turn add supply to the 
market, pulling prices down further. Add to the mix variables such as job losses, defaults 
                                                 
3 In more technical detail, these techniques try to find a linear combination of several nonstationary 
variables that is stationary. The coefficients in this linear relationship represent long-run effects. Often, 
cointegrating relationships are estimated as part of a “error correction mechanism” specification, which 
shows how the variables are buffeted by random shocks but are also pulled toward their long-run 
relationship.    9
in other subprime credit markets, tightening standards for obtaining loans, bankruptcies 
of financial institutions, and one can concoct scenarios that seem plausible but cannot be 
understood simply in terms of an econometric estimate of the marginal effect of one 
variable on another. No one can be sure that such a scenario will occur, or how serious it 
might be, but the possibility is there. 
  Given the possible shortcomings of econometric estimates, the need to evaluate 
the impact of the housing market slowdown on the economy has been pursued—in the 
Levy macroeconometric model—through some simple indicators affecting domestic 
private expenditure. Our results are calculated in the form of elasticities—the percentage 
increase in one variable for a 1 percent increase in another variable. We find that the 
elasticity of real private expenditure to the median home price is quite low, at 0.04, 
during the quarter when a shock to home prices hits, and rises to 0.12 when the shock is 
entirely absorbed, with a mean lag of about five months. According to our estimates, the 
recent decline in home prices is slowly having its effects on real private expenditure, and 
we expect the effects to persist in the second and third quarters of this year. 
  More importantly, a drop in house prices is likely to reduce the willingness and 
ability of consumers to borrow and, according to our estimates, this will have additional 
effects on expenditure. Our estimates imply a short-run elasticity of real expenditure to 
household borrowing at 0.01, and a long-run elasticity of 0.03. 
  In the first quarter of 2007, house prices declined 3 percent compared to the 
previous quarter, and household borrowing dropped 15.6 percent. The two effects 
combined imply a drop of about 0.9 percent in expenditure in the long run, and about 0.4 
percent by the second quarter of 2007. These effects can, of course, be countered by 
positive shocks arising from real disposable income, or the equity market, but May data 
on real weekly earnings show that wages are not keeping up with inflation, and this will 
put further pressure on household expenditure. 
  Although real consumption growth has remained high in the first quarter of 2007, 
at 4.2 percent, a growth-recession scenario, such as those we analyzed in recent Strategic 
Analyses (Papadimitriou, Zezza, and Hannsgen 2006; Godley, Papadimitriou, and Zezza 
2007), is becoming more and more likely. 
   10
RECENT FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS: ADDING TO, OR CONJURING 
AWAY, SYSTEMIC RISK 
 
Real estate crises have happened before in many countries, but two recent developments 
in the way homes are financed will greatly affect how the current situation plays out. This 
section will outline these two developments, and discuss whether they are benign. First, 
financial institutions that originate mortgages often do not hold them on their books or 
bear the risk of a default. Rather, an increasing number of mortgages are sold by their 
originators to institutions that bundle them into mortgage-backed securities, which are 
traded like any other bonds. The biggest players in this business are the so-called 
government-sponsored entities (GSEs such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae), which have 
drawn the fire of Bernanke (2007a) and others. These critics within the financial 
establishment and elsewhere argue that the GSEs enjoy an implicit government 
guarantee, which allows them to pay low interest rates on the money they borrow. This 
arrangement amounts to a subsidy by taxpayers, who may ultimately foot the bill for a 
bailout. Another aspect of the “securitization” business is the resale of various “tranches” 
of mortgage-backed securities, a practice that divvies up default risk among investors 
who are yet another step removed from the actual lending process. There also exist credit 
derivatives that simply obligate someone to insure against default of a certain bundle of 
mortgages held by someone else. The result is that my pension fund may bear the risk 
that someone fails to pay the interest on their mortgage, while your pension fund will lose 
out if the same person fails to pay his or her principal. While it is known that various 
institutional investors hold much of this risk, there is no complete accounting of exactly 
who is exposed and to what extent, since hedge funds and the like are not as heavily 
scrutinized by regulators as traditional financial intermediaries, such as banks.
4 In what 
might be a sign of things to come, Bear Stearns, one of the biggest investors in subprime 
mortgages, has recently lent $3.2 billion to rescue one of its own hedge funds that had 
large holdings in securities backed by subprime mortgages.  
                                                 
4 See Chilcote (2006) for a detailed discussion of credit derivatives.  
   11
  The second major development that will make this real estate collapse different 
from those that came before is the greatly expanded use of “exotic” and subprime 
mortgages, and the general trend toward higher loan-to-home value ratios. Shiller argues 
that the new real estate crash “could be more severe this time than it was in 1990, since 
this time the loan to value ratio is much higher, and so the effects of the decline on 
defaults would be bigger” (2004, p. 14). The term “exotic” simply refers to such risky 
practices as interest rates that jump after a period in which the borrower enjoys a below-
market “teaser” rate; mortgages that allow the principal to grow for a time, rather than 
being steadily paid off; zero downpayments; and waivers of the usual requirements to 
provide proof of income when applying for a loan. The subprime business is simply the 
extension of credit to those who are regarded as relatively poor credit risks; these 
mortgages carry higher interest rates, and the people who grant them usually earn 
commensurately higher commissions. The mortgage industry has steadfastly maintained 
that more efficient, automated credit scoring makes these loans safe, but apparently 
lenders are no longer sure of this, as they are rapidly eliminating some of the new lending 
practices (Shenn 2007; Bajaj 2007; Ng 2007). Some investment bankers who provided 
the ultimate source of funding for many of these loans now deny that they were aware of 
the amount of risk being taken on, and some lenders in turn say they would not have 
taken such risks, except because the investment banks were pressuring them to do so 
(Bajaj 2007). Also, some lenders have apparently been using creative accounting 
techniques to hide losses they have been incurring for some time (Browning 2007). All of 
these facts have been reported in the financial press, but those using questionable lending 
criteria have so far been a few steps ahead of the sheriff—the governmental bodies that 
have real power to stop the most irresponsible practices. Moreover, some financial 
practices that have hidden the extent of the problem—such as valuing illiquid derivatives 
according to a optimistic model, rather than market prices—are legal and have been 
accepted for many years. We look at possible belated responses from the authorities 
below. 
  The course of the housing crisis will depend on what has really been going on, as 
a dizzying array of new financial products has come online. We have suggested a 
pessimistic view: lightly regulated lenders have been taking undue risk. Those who see a   12
brighter picture acknowledge risks, but see mortgage developments as part of a market-
driven flowering of innovations that bring benefits to the economy and society (Rajan 
and Zingales 2003). These optimists, who range from articulate, broad-brush advocates of 
free markets to learned experts in academic economics, point to three key themes in the 
rapid growth and development of modern financial markets and banking: 1) a 
democratization that brings credit to those who lack “collateral and connections” (Rajan 
and Zingales 2003); 2) increased choice of when to spend lifetime income that sometimes 
arrives erratically or too late in life (Hurst and Stafford 2004; Gerardi, Rosen, and Willen 
2007); 3) reduced costs of borrowing due to increased efficiency of the lending process 
and the spreading of risk to those most willing and able to bear it (Kroszner 2007). 
Innovations in mortgage lending are believed to bring all three of these benefits. 
Democratization occurs when increasing numbers of moderate income people of all races 
and ethnicities are enabled to obtain subprime mortgages (Goolsbee 2007; Posner 2007; 
Becker 2007). Choice is expanded, for example, when families with an unemployed adult 
are able to take out a home equity loan to pay their bills until a job is found. The costs of 
lending are reduced when modern software is used to reduce the costs of verifying 
creditworthiness and grinding through mortgage paperwork. 
  Another approach to recent financial developments, which concentrates on the 
borrowers, rather than the supply side, alleges irresponsible or “infantile” behavior on the 
part of overextended and pampered consumers (Barber 2007; Surowiecki 2007). Writers 
in this vein have argued that citizens have become absorbed in the acquisition of material 
goods and/or have knowingly taken on unmanageable loans.  
  A third way of looking at the recent explosion of new lending practices is more 
deeply skeptical than the free-marketeers and technocratic economists and more 
circumspect than the moral critics (McCulley 2007; Minsky 1975, 1986; Wolfson 1994). 
The financial and banking industries have undergone waves of innovation since 
consumer credit became widely available early in the 20th century. These waves have 
been spurred partly by the profit motive and the need to outwit the regulators, and partly 
by the innate human tendencies of greed, herd behavior, and overoptimism. Hyman 
Minsky’s financial fragility theory (1975 and 1986) showed how the economy is subject 
to one crisis after another, as “Ponzi” and “speculative” finance repeatedly burgeon until   13
an inevitable and disastrous bust. Each time, a new, apparently failsafe investment causes 
the problem, ranging from tulip bulbs to junk bonds, but the pattern is the same. Speaking 
in favor of this interpretation is the fact that lending standards have been very lax relative 
to historical norms, and the ratio of house prices to rents is still high, compared to 
previous levels. Moreover, the use of credit derivatives to shed risk associated with 
holding mortgages can be seen as an instance of a kind of shell game—well-known to 
Minsky—in which financial firms evade regulatory control by introducing new financial 
instruments and markets that escape the purview of the regulators, at least at first.
5 
  Seen in this way, the housing crisis takes on a different cast. Clearly, there is 
some truth to the notion that credit has been democratized over the years, and that 
borrowers have more choices and enjoy easier terms. Regarding the democratization, 
though, subprime borrowers do not benefit when they take out loans that they simply 
cannot afford, while mortgage bankers reap commissions, and some company insiders 
exit with millions of dollars in profits from timely stock sales (Ordower 2007). In 
particular, recently originated subprime mortgages will probably result in a net decrease 
in homeownership, because there will be numerous foreclosures, and because many 
subprime home loans are not used to finance first-time home purchases (Center for 
Responsible Lending 2007). As we have noted, the social costs of foreclosures will be 
borne by the very people who have apparently been the beneficiaries of democratization.  
  Turning to the argument that the widespread availability of loans confers an 
increased ability to choose when to consume lifetime income (a process known by 
economists as “consumption smoothing”), it is interesting to note the diametrically 
opposed views of the market-oriented optimists and the third, Minskyan view. According 
to the optimists, modern, liberalized finance and banking stabilize the economy by 
allowing people to borrow in recessions to maintain consumption. The Minskyan story, 
on the other hand, shows that the increasing availability of credit and proliferation of new 
financial products represents the unsustainable upward phase of a potentially unstable 
                                                 
5 Minsky, possibly under the influence of his undergraduate mentors at the University of Chicago, 
developed the notion that financial innovations could be used to circumvent regulation in one of his first 
articles (1957). In that article, he was concerned with the ways banks skirted reserve requirements using 
new institutions, such as the federal funds market. But the general notion that banks outfox regulators by 
staying one technological step ahead of them also applies to recent mortgage innovations. On the other 
hand, there is also a less sinister motive: simply to obtain funds at the lowest possible interest rate.   14
cycle. This story seems transparently accurate, at least with regard to the most exotic 
lending practices. According to this story, when the inevitable decline occurs, easy credit 
will no longer be around to cushion the impact, and we will all be reminded that the cycle 
is a brutal reality and financial innovations have both costs and benefits.  
  The Minskyan view not only belies the optimists’ story of the end of financial 
history, but it also sheds light on the myopia of those who foresee a decadent end of the 
world. Consumerism is nothing new, and while the boundless quest for material goods 
undoubtedly draws attention away from the world’s real problems and wreaks 
environmental havoc, human psychology is such that people find it hard to turn down 
easy money. As mentioned above, history is rife with examples, reminding us that we 
may be witnessing one phase of a cycle that has repeated itself many times in the United 
States since the 1960s (Wolfson 1994). Moreover, we have little empirical evidence that 
home equity is withdrawn mainly to finance frivolous or luxurious purchases. Finally, it 
is probable that many borrowers were simply deceived or confused by fine print. (How 
many of us have been stuck with a piece of faulty merchandise or failed to peruse the 
details of a disclaimer?) All this is not to gainsay the role of individual responsibility and 
education, which are always relevant in these episodes, or to say that loans were never 
used for wasteful purposes, but simply to put this financial episode into perspective, as a 
chapter in a very long history. The history also shows that the solution lies partly in a 
regulatory response, and not harsh bankruptcy terms for irresponsible individuals, which 
would only delay recovery.  
 
WHAT TO DO NOW 
 
We have argued that the stage has been set for very serious and widespread economic 
difficulties, which may have begun to unfold. Policymakers cannot possibly forestall 
further declines in home values, save the more reckless mortgage lenders from 
bankruptcy, or bail out every overextended household. Clearly, macroeconomic policy 
will be critical: if the Fed and Congress can work to stop any incipient recession, they 
will prevent job losses, which are one of the main contributors to foreclosures. An 
effective job-creation method can be some form of employer-of-last-resort program that   15
offers government jobs to all workers who ask for them (Minsky 1986; Papadimitriou 
1999; Wray 1998). Moreover, the Fed must be ready to step in as a lender of last resort, 
should major financial institutions falter. In the current situation, pension funds, with 
their vast direct and indirect mortgage-related investments, may be as exposed to danger 
as banks. Pensions are backed with a separate bailout fund (which, at present, is also in 
jeopardy), not by bank regulators. The pension system is already failing millions of 
retirees, and many pension funds are not financially sound even now. Moreover, 
homeownership has been the most important form of personal saving, but with the rise in 
home-equity withdrawal and declining home values, this may no longer be true. Social 
Security, long the main source of income for older Americans of modest income, will be 
more important than ever. Benefit increases may be politically infeasible, but the system 
must be protected from ill-advised efforts to protect the trust fund, which would probably 
increase poverty (Papadimitriou and Wray 1999).  
  Congress has begun to hold hearings on possible remedies, and the Fed is well 
aware of the need for action. Bernanke has stated that some new regulatory efforts to 
stem abuses have been in the pipeline since 2006 (2007b). However, proposed rules focus 
narrowly on the mortgage problem. He supports efforts by nonprofit organizations and 
others to help financially distressed homeowners renegotiate the terms of their loans 
(2007c). Some members of Congress argue that federal dollars, matched with 
contributions from financial firms, should be offered to help finance such “workouts.” 
This approach would allow more families to stay in their homes, though the majority 
could not be helped. Even if the terms of loans are changed to help homeowners, 
payments will usually still be burdensome, and foreclosure for some families will be 
families merely postponed. However, there may be no better option for many households 
who cannot afford their mortgages. 
  Bernanke remains supportive of a system that relies on transparency rather than 
regulation, suggesting that the mortgage industry would not be in trouble if it had been 
credibly warned years ago that it could not rely on a government bailout. Strong 
opponents of regulation would go further, claiming that the financial fallout from the 
current episode will deter further abuses (Becker 2007; Posner 2007). But in the 
competitive and freewheeling mortgage banking and hedge fund industries, the pressure   16
to improve the bottom line this quarter is very strong, even in the face of a credible threat 
of devastating losses at some point in the future. Bankers and others who lend money 
cannot be concerned with defaults that may occur in a few years if they risk losing their 
jobs tomorrow. Some of the perils of this exposure have been discovered in the Bear 
Stearns hedge funds. Moreover, company insiders often profit handsomely, even when 
their employers approach bankruptcy (for an example, see Ordower 2007). The 
proposition that firms and investors rarely take on excessive risk without the assurance of 
a government guarantee seems empirically dubious.  
  Whatever the future prospects for a transparent system that punishes risky 
behavior, Congress, the administration, and the regulators must now deal as best it can 
with the failures of the past that brought about the current crisis. In doing so, we must be 
slaves neither to an idealized view of the financial system nor to old ways of doing 
business that seemed to be working well until recently.  
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